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Abstract
Several works have proposed Simplicity Bias (SB)—the tendency of standard
training procedures such as Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) to find simple
models—to justify why neural networks generalize well [1, 47, 69]. However, the
precise notion of simplicity remains vague. Furthermore, previous settings [62, 23]
that use SB to justify why neural networks generalize well do not simultaneously
capture the brittleness of neural networks—a widely observed phenomenon in
practice [66, 34]. To this end, we introduce a collection of piecewise-linear and
image-based datasets that (a) naturally incorporate a precise notion of simplicity
and (b) capture the subtleties of neural networks trained on real datasets. Through
theory and experiments on these datasets, we show that SB of SGD and variants
is extreme: neural networks rely exclusively on the simplest feature and remain
invariant to all predictive complex features. Consequently, the extreme nature
of SB explains why seemingly benign distribution shifts and small adversarial
perturbations significantly degrade model performance. Moreover, contrary to
conventional wisdom, SB can also hurt generalization on the same data distribution,
as SB persists even when the simplest feature has less predictive power than
the more complex features. We also demonstrate that common approaches for
improving generalization and robustness—ensembles and adversarial training—do
not mitigate SB and its shortcomings. Given the central role played by SB in
generalization and robustness, we hope that the datasets and methods in this paper
serve as an effective testbed to evaluate novel algorithmic approaches aimed at
avoiding the pitfalls of extreme SB.
1 Introduction
The surprisingly good generalization ability of neural networks, despite their high capacity to fit even
randomly labeled data [78], has been a subject of intense study. One line of recent work [62, 23] proves
that linear neural networks trained with Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) on linearly separable
data converge to the maximum-margin linear classifier, thereby explaining the good generalization
performance. However, maximum-margin classifiers are inherently robust to perturbations of data
at prediction time, and this implication is at odds with concrete evidence that neural networks, in
practice, are brittle to adversarial examples [66] and distribution shifts [50, 55, 42, 61]. Hence, the
linear setting, while convenient to analyze, is insufficient to capture the subtleties of neural networks
trained on real datasets. Going beyond the linear setting, several works [1, 47, 69] argue that neural
networks generalize well because standard training procedures have a bias towards learning simple
models. However, the exact notion of “simple" models remains vague and only intuitive. Moreover,
the settings studied are insufficient to capture the brittleness of neural networks
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Our goal is to formally understand and probe the simplicity bias (SB) of neural networks in a setting
that is rich enough to capture real-world problems and, at the same time, amenable to theoretical
analysis & targeted experiments. Our starting point is the observation that on real-world datasets,
there are several distinct ways to discriminate between labels (e.g., by inferring shape, color etc. in
image classification) that are (a) predictive of the label to varying extents, and (b) define decision
boundaries of varying complexity. For example, in the image classification task of white swans vs.
bears, a linear-like (simple) classifier that only looks at color could predict correctly on most instances
except white polar bears, while a nonlinear (complex) classifier that infers shape would almost perfect
predictive power. To systematically understand SB, we design synthetic and image-based datasets
wherein different coordinates (or blocks) define decision boundaries of varying complexity. We refer
to each coordinate / block as a feature and define a precise notion of feature simplicity based on the
simplicity of the corresponding decision boundary.
Proposed dataset. Figure 1 illustrates a stylized version of the proposed synthetic dataset with two
features, φ1 and φ2, that can perfectly predict the label with 100% accuracy, but differ in simplicity.
Figure 1: Simple vs. complex features
The simplicity of a feature is precisely determined by the min-
imum number of linear pieces in the decision boundary that
achieves optimal classification accuracy using that feature.
For example, in Figure 1, the simple feature φ1 requires a lin-
ear decision boundary to perfectly predict the label, whereas
complex feature φ2 requires four linear pieces. Along sim-
ilar lines, we also introduce a collection of image-based
datasets in which each image concatenates MNIST images
(simple feature) and CIFAR-10 images (complex feature).
The proposed datasets, which incorporate features of varying
predictive power and simplicity, allow us to systematically
investigate and measure SB in trained neural networks.
Observations from new dataset. The ideal decision boundary that achieves high accuracy and
robustness relies on all features to obtain a large margin (minimum distance from any point to decision
boundary). For example, the orange decision boundary in Figure 1 that learns φ1 and φ2 attains 100%
accuracy and exhibits more robustness than the linear boundary because of larger margin. Given the
expressive power of large neural networks, one might expect that a network trained on the dataset
in Figure 1 would result in the larger-margin orange piecewise linear boundary. However, in practice,
we find quite the opposite—trained neural networks have a linear boundary. Surprisingly, neural
networks exclusively use feature φ1 and remain completely invariant to φ2. More generally, we
observe that SB is extreme: neural networks simply ignore several complex predictive features in the
presence of few simple predictive features. We first theoretically show that one-hidden-layer neural
networks trained on the piecewise linear dataset exhibit SB. Then, through controlled experiments,
we validate the extreme nature of SB across model architectures and optimizers.
Implications of extreme SB. Theoretical analysis and controlled experiments on the proposed
synthetic and image-based datasets reveal three major pitfalls of SB:
(i) Lack of robustness: Neural networks exclusively latch on to the simplest feature (e.g., background)
at the expense of very small margin and completely ignore complex predictive features (e.g., semantics
of the object), even when all features have equal predictive power. This results in susceptibility to
small adversarial perturbations (due to small margin) and spurious correlations (with simple features).
Furthermore, in Section 4, we provide a concrete connection between SB and data-agnostic and
model-agnostic universal adversarial perturbations [45] observed in practice.
(ii) Lack of reliable confidence estimates: Ideally, a network should have high confidence only if
all predictive features agree in their prediction. However due to extreme SB, the network has high
confidence even if several complex predictive features contradict the simple feature, mirroring the
widely reported inaccurate and substantially higher confidence estimates reported in practice [49, 24].
(iii) Suboptimal generalization: Surprisingly, neural networks exclusively rely on the simplest feature
even if it less predictive of the label than all complex features in the synthetic datasets. Consequently,
contrary to conventional wisdom, extreme SB can hurt robustness as well as generalization.
In stark contrast, prior works [8, 62, 23] only extol SB by considering settings where all useful
predictive features are simple and hence do not reveal the pitfalls observed in real-world settings.
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Summary. This work makes two key contributions. First, we provide theoretical and empirical
evidence that neural networks exhibit extreme SB, which we identify as a unifying explanation for
various failure modes of deep learning in practice. To the best of our knowledge, prior works only
focus on the positive aspect of SB: the lack of overfitting in practice. Second, we design datasets that
offer a precise stratification of features based on simplicity and predictive power. Additionally, we
find that standard approaches to improve generalization and robustness—ensembles and adversarial
training—do not mitigate simplicity bias and its shortcomings. Given the important implications of
SB, we hope these datasets serve as a useful testbed for devising better training procedures.
Organization. We discuss related work in Section 2. Section 3 describes the proposed datasets
and metrics. In Section 4, we concretely establish the extreme nature of Simplicity Bias (SB) and
its shortcomings through theory and empirics. Section 5 shows that extreme SB can in fact hurt
generalization as well. We conclude and discuss the way forward in Section 6.
2 Related Work
Given space constraints, we only discuss directly related work and defer the rest to Appendix A.
Out-of-Distribution (OOD) performance: Several works demonstrate that NNs tend to learn spuri-
ous features & low-level statistical patterns rather than semantic features & high-level abstractions,
resulting in poor OOD performance [34, 20, 43, 50]. This phenomenon has been exploited to design
backdoor attacks against NNs [6, 12] as well. Recent works [72, 71] that encourage models to learn
higher-level features improve OOD performance, but require domain-specific knowledge to penalize
reliance on spurious features such as image texture [20] and annotation artifacts [25] in vision &
language tasks. Learning robust representations without domain knowledge, however, necessitates
formalizing the notion of features and feature reliance; our work takes a step in this direction.
Adversarial robustness: Neural networks exhibit vulnerability to small adversarial perturba-
tions [66]. Standard approaches to mitigate this issue—adversarial training [22, 40] and ensem-
bles [64, 51, 35]—have had limited success on large-scale datasets. Consequently, several works have
investigated reasons underlying the existence of adversarial examples: [22] suggests local linearity
of trained NNs, [58] indicates insufficient data, [59] suggests inevitability in high dimensions, [9]
suggests computational barriers, [16] proposes limitations of neural network architectures, and [31]
proposes the presence of non-robust features. Additionally, Jacobsen et al. [32] show that NNs exhibit
invariance to large label-relevant perturbations. Prior works have also demonstrated the existence of
universal adversarial perturbations (UAPs) that are agnostic to model and data [52, 45, 68].
Multiple works mentioned above (a) differentially characterize learned features and desired features—
statistical regularities vs. high-level concepts [34], syntactic cues vs. semantic meaning [43], robust
vs. non-robust features [31]—and (b) posit that the mismatch between these features results in non-
robustness. Our work instead probes why neural networks prefer one set of features over another and
unifies the aforementioned disparate feature characterizations through the lens of feature simplicity.
3 Preliminaries: Setup and Metrics
Setting and metrics: We focus on binary classification. Given samples D̂ = {(xi, yi)}ni=1 from
distribution D over Rd × {−1, 1}, the goal is to learn a scoring function s(x) : Rd → R (such
as logits), and an associated classifier f : Rd → {−1, 1} defined as f(x) = 2h(x)−1 where
h(x) = 1{softmax(s(x)) < 0.5}. We use two well-studied metrics for generalization and robustness:
Standard accuracy. The standard accuracy of a classifier f is: ED [1{f(x) = y}].
δ-Robust accuracy. Given norm ‖·‖ and perturbation budget δ, the δ-robust accuracy of a classifier
f is: ED
[
min‖xˆ−x‖≤δ 1{f(xˆ) = y}
]
.
Next, we introduce two metrics that quantitatively capture the extent to which a model relies on
different input coordinates (or features). Let S denote some subset of coordinates [d] and DS denote
the S-randomized distribution, which is obtained as follows: given DS , the marginal distribution of
S, DS independently samples ((xS , xSc), y) ∼ D and xS ∼ DS and then outputs ((xS , xSc), y). In
DS , the coordinates in S are rendered independent of the label y. The two metrics are as follows.
Definition 1 (Randomized accuracy). Given data distribution D, and subset of coordinates S ⊆ [d],
the S-randomized accuracy of a classifier f is given by: EDS [1{f(x) = y}].
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Accuracy AUC Logits
S-Randomized 0.5 0.5 randomly shuffled
Sc-Randomized standard accuracy standard AUC essentially identical
Table 1: If the {S, Sc }-randomized metrics of a model behave as above, then
that model relies exclusively on S and is invariant to Sc.
Definition 2 (Randomized AUC). Given data distribution D and subset of coordinates S ⊆ [d], the
S-randomized AUC of classifier f equals the area under the precision-recall curve of distribution DS .
Our experiments use {S, Sc }-randomized metrics—accuracy, AUC, logits—to establish that f
depends exclusively on some features S and remains invariant to the rest Sc. First, if (a) S-randomized
accuracy and AUC equal 0.5 and (b) S-randomized logit distribution is a random shuffling of the
original distribution (i.e., logits in the original distribution are randomly shuffled across true positives
and true negatives), then f depends exclusively on S. Conversely, if (a) Sc-randomized accuracy and
AUC are equal to standard accuracy and AUC and (b) Sc-randomized logit distribution is essentially
identical to the original distribution, then f is invariant to Sc; Table 1 summarizes these observations.
3.1 Datasets
One-dimensional Building Blocks: Our synthetic datasets use three one-dimensional data blocks—
linear, noisy linear and k-slabs—shown in top row of Figure 2. In the linear block, positive and
negative examples are uniformly distributed in [0.1, 1] and [−1,−0.1] respectively. In the noisy linear
block, given a noise parameter p ∈ [0, 1], 1− p fraction of points are distributed like the linear block
described above and p fraction of the examples are uniformly distributed in [−0.1, 0.1]. In k-slab
blocks, positive and negative examples are distributed in k well-separated, alternating regions.
Simplicity of Building Blocks: Linear classifiers can attain the optimal (Bayes) accuracy of 1 and
1− p/2 on the linear and p-noisy linear blocks respectively. For k-slabs, however, (k−1)-piecewise
linear classifiers are required to obtain the optimal accuracy of 1. Consequently, the building blocks
have a natural notion of simplicity: minimum number of pieces required by a piecewise linear
classifier to attain optimal accuracy. With this notion, the linear and noisy linear blocks are simpler
than k-slab blocks when k > 2, and k-slab blocks are simpler than `-slab blocks when k < `.
Multi-dimensional Synthetic Datasets: We now outline four d-dimensional datasets wherein each
coordinate corresponds to one of three building blocks described above. See Figure 2 for illustration.
• LMS-k: Linear and multiple k-slabs; the first coordinate is a linear block and the remaining d−1
coordinates are independent k-slab blocks; we use LMS-5 & LMS-7 datasets in our analysis.
• LˆMS-k: Noisy linear and multiple k-slab blocks; the first coordinate is a noisy linear block and the
remaining d−1 coordinates are independent k-slab blocks. The noise parameter p is 0.2 by default.
• MS-(5,7): 5-slab and multiple 7-slab blocks; the first coordinate is a 5-slab block and the remaining
d−1 coordinates are independent 7-slab blocks, as shown in Figure 2.
• MS-5: Multiple 5-slab blocks; all coordinates are independent 5-slab blocks.
We now describe the LSN (linear, 3-slab & noise) dataset, a stylized version of LMS-k that is amenable
to theoretical analysis. In LSN, conditioned on the label y, the first and second coordinates of x are
Figure 2: (Synthetic & Image-based Datasets) One-dimensional building blocks (top row)—linear,
noisy linear, k-slab—are used to construct multi-dimensional datasets (bottom row): LMS-5 (linear &
multiple 5-slabs), LˆMS-5 (noisy linear & multiple 5-slabs) and MS-(5,7) (5-slab & multiple 7-slabs).
MNIST-CIFAR data vertically concatenates MNIST and CIFAR images (see Section 3.1).
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singleton linear and 3-slab blocks: linear and 3-slab blocks have support on {−1, 1} and {−1, 0, 1}
respectively. The remaining coordinates are standard gaussians and not predictive of the label.
The synthetic datasets comprise features of varying simplicity; in LMS-k, LˆMS-k, & MS-(5,7), the
first coordinate is the simplest feature and in MS-5, all features are equally simple. All datasets, even
LˆMS-k, can be perfectly classified via piecewise linear classifiers. Note that we (a) apply a random
rotation matrix to the data and (b) use 50-dimensional synthetic datasets (i.e., d = 50) by default.
MNIST-CIFAR Data: The MNIST-CIFAR dataset consists of two classes: images in class -1 and
class 1 are vertical concatenations of MNIST digit zero & CIFAR-10 automobile and MNIST digit one
& CIFAR-10 truck images respectively, as shown in Figure 2. The training and test datasets comprise
50,000 and 10,000 images of size 3× 64× 32. The MNIST-CIFAR dataset mirrors the structure in
the synthetic LMS-k dataset—both incorporate simple and complex features. The MNIST and CIFAR
blocks correspond to the linear and k-slab blocks in LMS-k respectively. Also note that MNIST images
are zero-padded & replicated across three channels to match CIFAR dimensions before concatenation.
Appendix B provides more details about the datasets, models, and optimizers used in our exper-
iments. Appendix C shows that our results are robust to the exact choice of MNIST-CIFAR class
pairs.
4 Simplicity Bias (SB) is Extreme and Leads to Non-Robustness
We first establish the extreme nature of SB in neural networks (NNs) trained via SGD and variants:
If all features have full predictive power, NNs rely exclusively on the simplest feature S and remain
invariant to all complex features Sc. Then, we explain why extreme SB results in neural networks
that are vulnerable to distribution shift and adversarial perturbations.
4.1 Neural networks provably exhibit Simplicity Bias (SB)
We consider the LSN dataset (described in Section 3.1) that has one linear coordinate and one 3-slab
coordinate, both fully predictive of the label on their own; the remaining d−2 noise coordinatesI do
not have any predictive power. Now, a "large-margin" one-hidden-layer NN with ReLU activation
should give equal weight to the linear and 3-slab coordinates. However, we prove that NNs trained
with standard mini-batch gradient descent (GD) on the LSN dataset (described in Section 3.1) provably
learns a classifier that exclusively relies on the “simple" linear coordinate, thus exhibiting simplicity
bias at the cost of margin. Further, our claim holds even when the margin in the linear coordinate
(minimum distance between linear coordinate of positives and negatives) is significantly smaller than
the margin in the slab coordinate. The proof of the following theorem is presented in Appendix F.
Theorem 1. Let f(x) =
∑k
j=1 vj · ReLU(
∑d
i=1 wi,jxi) denote a one-hidden-layer neural network
with k hidden units and ReLU activations. Set vj = ±1/√k w.p. 1/2 ∀j ∈ [k]. Let {(xi, yi)}mi=1
denote i.i.d. samples from LSN where m ∈ [cd2, dα/c] for some α > 2. Then, given d > Ω(√k log k)
and initial wij ∼ N (0, 1dk log4 d ), after O(1) iterations, mini-batch gradient descent (over w) with
hinge loss, constant step size, mini-batch size Θ(m), satisfies:
• Test error is at most 1/poly(d)
• The learned weights of hidden units wij satisfy:
|w1j | = 2√
k
(
1− c√
log d
)
+O
(
1√
dk log d
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Linear Coordinate
, |w2,j | = O
(
1√
dk log d
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
3-Slab Coordinate
, ‖w3:d,j‖ = O
(
1√
k log d
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
d−2 Noise Coordinates
with probability greater than 1− 1poly(d) . Note that c is a universal constant.
Remarks: First, we see that the trained model essentially relies only on the linear coordinate w1j—
SGD sets the value of w1j roughly Ω˜(
√
d) larger than the slab coordinates w2j that do not change
much from their initial value. Second, the initialization we use is widely studied in the deep learning
theory [44, 74] as it better reflects the practical performance of neural networks [14]. Third, given
that LSN is linearly separable, Brutzkus et al. [8] guarantee convergence of test error; in contrast,
however, our result additionally gives a precise description of the final classifier.
4.2 Simplicity Bias (SB) is Extreme in Practice
We now establish the extreme nature of SB on datasets with features of varying simplicity—LMS-5,
MS-(5,7), MNIST-CIFAR (described in Section 3)—across multiple model architectures and opti-
mizers. Recall that (a) the simplicity of one-dimensional building blocks is defined as the number of
5
(a) original, Sc-randomized and S-randomized logit distribution for true positives
Dataset Set Sc Size |Sc| Randomized AUC
Set S Set Sc
LMS-5 all5-Slabs
49 0.50± 0.01 1.00± 0.00
249 0.50± 0.01 1.00± 0.00
MS-(5,7) all7-Slabs
49 0.49± 0.01 1.00± 0.00
249 0.50± 0.01 1.00± 0.00
(b) {S, Sc}-Randomized AUCs of (2000,1)-FCNs (c) Decision boundaries of trained (100,1)-FCNs
Figure 3: Extreme SB on LMS-5, MS-(5,7) and MNIST-CIFAR datasets (a) S-randomized logit
distribution of true positives is essentially identical to the original logit distribution of true positives
(before randomization). However, Sc-randomized logit distribution of true positives is a randomly
shuffled version of original logit distribution; Sc-randomized logits are shuffled across true positives
and negatives. (b) {S, Sc }-randomized AUCs (summarized in Table 1) are 0.5 and 1.0 respectively
for varying number of complex features |Sc|. (c) FCN decision boundaries projected onto S & the
most influential coordinate in Sc shows that the boundary depends only on S and is invariant to Sc.
pieces required by a piecewise linear classifier acting only on that block to get optimal accuracy and
(b) LMS-5 has one linear block & multiple 5-slabs, MS-(5,7) has one 5-slab and multiple 7-slabs
and MNIST-CIFAR concatenates MNIST and CIFAR10 images. We now use S to denote the simplest
feature in each dataset: linear in LMS-5, 5-slab in MS-(5,7), and MNIST in MNIST-CIFAR.
We first consistently observe that SGD-trained models trained on LMS-5 and MS-(5,7) datasets
exhibit extreme SB: they exclusively rely on the simplest feature S and remain invariant to all complex
features Sc. Using S-randomized & Sc-randomized metrics summarized in Table 1, we first establish
extreme SB on fully-connected (FCN), convolutional (CNN) & sequential (GRU [15]) models. We
observe that the S-randomized AUC is 0.5 across models. That is, unsurprisingly, all models are
critically dependent on S. Surprisingly, however, Sc-randomized AUC of all models on both datasets
equals 1.0. That is, arbitrarily perturbing Sc coordinates has no impact on the class predictions or the
ranking of true positives’ logits against true negatives’ logits. One might expect that perturbing Sc
would at least bring the logits of positives and negatives closer to each other. Figure 3(a) answers this
in negative—the logit distributions over true positives of (100,1)-FCNs (i.e., with width 100 & depth
1) remain unchanged even after randomizing all complex features Sc. Conversely, randomizing the
simplest feature S randomly shuffles the original logits across true positives as well as true negatives.
The two-dimensional projections of FCN decision boundaries in Figure 3(c) visually confirm that
FCNs exclusively depend on the simpler coordinate S and are invariant to all complex features Sc.
Note that sample size and model architecture do not present any obstacles in learning complex
features Sc to achieve 100% accuracy. In fact, if S is removed from the dataset, SGD-trained models
with the same sample size indeed rely on Sc to attain 100% accuracy. Increasing the number of
complex features does not mitigate extreme SB either. Figure 3(b) shows that even when there
are 249 complex features and only one simple feature, (2000,1)-FCNs exclusively rely on the
simplest feature S; randomizing Sc keeps AUC score of 1.0 intact but simply randomizing S drops
the AUC score to 0.5. (2000,1)-FCNs exhibit extreme SB despite their expressive power to learn
large-margin classifiers that rely on all simple and complex features.
Similarly, on the MNIST-CIFAR dataset, MobileNetV2 [57], GoogLeNet [65], ResNet50 [26] and
DenseNet121 [30] exhibit extreme SB. All models exclusively latch on to the simpler MNIST block
to acheive 100% accuracy and remain invariant to the CIFAR block, even though the CIFAR block
alone is almost fully predictive of its label—GoogLeNet attains 95.4% accuracy on the corresponding
CIFAR binary classification task. Figure 3(a) shows that randomizing the simpler MNIST block
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Figure 4: Extreme SB results in vulnerability to small-magnitude model-agnostic and data-agnostic
Universal Adversarial Perturbations (UAPs) that nullify model performance by only perturbing the
simplest feature S. `2 UAPs utilize most of the perturbation budget to attack S alone: 99.6% for
linear in LMS-5, 99.9% for 5-slab in MS-(5,7) and 99.3% for MNIST pixels in MNIST-CIFAR. The
UAPs in this figure are rescaled for visualization purposes.
randomly shuffles the logit distribution of true positives whereas randomizing the CIFAR block has no
effect—the CIFAR-randomized and original logit distribution over true positives essentially overlap.
To summarize, we use S-randomized and Sc-randomized metrics to establish that models trained on
synthetic and image-based datasets exhibit extreme SB: If all features have full predictive power, NNs
rely exclusively on the simplest feature S and remain invariant to all complex features Sc. We further
validate our results on extreme SB across model architectures, activation functions, optimizers and
regularization methods such as `2 regularization and dropout in Appendix C.
4.3 Extreme Simplicity Bias (SB) leads to Non-Robustness
Now, we discuss how extreme SB helps reconcile the fact that NNs have poor OOD performance and
adversarial vulnerability despite generalizing well on the same data distribution.
Poor OOD performance: Given that neural networks tend to heavily rely on spurious features [43,
50], state-of-the-art accuracies on large and diverse validation sets provide a false sense of security;
even benign distributional changes to the data (e.g., domain shifts) during prediction time can
drastically degrade or even nullify model performance. This phenomenon, though counter-intuitive,
can be easily explained through the lens of extreme SB. Specifically, we hypothesize that spurious
features are simple. This hypothesis, when combined with extreme SB, explains the outsized impact
of spurious features. For example, Figure 3(b) shows that simply perturbing the simplest (and
potentially spurious in practice) feature S drops the AUC of trained neural networks to 0.5, thereby
nullifying model performance. Randomizing all complex features Sc—5-slabs in LMS-5, 7-slabs in
MS-(5,7), CIFAR block in MNIST-CIFAR—has negligible effect on the trained neural networks—
Sc-randomized and original logits essentially overlap—even though Sc and S have equal predictive
power This further implies that approaches [28, 38] that aim to detect distribution shifts based on
model outputs such as logits or softmax probabilities may themselves fail due to extreme SB.
Adversarial Vulnerability: Consider a classifier f∗ that attains 100% accuracy on the LMS-5 dataset
by taking an average of the linear classifier on the linear coordinate and d−1 piecewise linear
classifiers, one for every 5-slab coordinate. By relying on all d features, f∗ has O(√d) margin. Now,
given the large margin, f∗ also attains high robust accuracy to `2 adversarial perturbations that have
norm O(√d)—the perturbations need to attack at least Ω(d) coordinates to flip model predictions.
However, despite high model capacity, SGD-trained NNs do not learn robust and large-margin
classifiers such as f∗. Instead, due to extreme SB, SGD-trained NNs exclusively rely on the
simplest feature S. Consequently, `2 perturbations with norm O(1) are enough to flip predictions and
degrade model performance. We validate this hypothesis in Figure 4, where FCNs, CNNs and GRUs
trained on LMS-5 and MS-(5,7) as well as DenseNet121 trained on MNIST-CIFAR are vulnerable to
small universal (i.e., data-agnostic) adversarial perturbations (UAPs) of the simplest feature S. For
example, Figure 4 shows that the `2 UAP of DenseNet121 on MNIST-CIFAR only attacks a few pixels
in the simpler MNIST block and does not perturb the CIFAR block. Extreme SB also explains why
data-agnostic UAPs of one model transfer well to another: the notion of simplicity is consistent across
models; Figure 4 shows that FCNs, CNNs and GRUs trained on LMS-5 and MS-(5,7) essentially learn
the same UAP. Furthermore, invariance to complex features Sc (e.g., CIFAR block in MNIST-CIFAR)
due to extreme SB explains why “natural" [29] and semantic label-relevant perturbations [5] that
modify the true image class do not alter model predictions.
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Accuracy SGD Adam
(100,1)-FCN (200,1)-FCN (200,2)-FCN (100,1)-FCN (200,1)-FCN (200,2)-FCN
Training Data 0.969± 0.004 0.997± 0.002 0.998± 0.000 0.970± 0.006 0.997± 0.001 1.000± 0.000
Test Data 0.888± 0.002 0.887± 0.001 0.894± 0.001 0.892± 0.001 0.893± 0.002 0.892± 0.002
Sc-Randomized 0.888± 0.002 0.887± 0.001 0.892± 0.002 0.889± 0.001 0.891± 0.001 0.892± 0.002
S-Randomized 0.498± 0.002 0.505± 0.005 0.501± 0.003 0.509± 0.003 0.502± 0.002 0.496± 0.008
Table 2: Extreme SB can hurt generalization: FCNs of varying depth and width trained on LˆMS-7 data
with SGD and Adam [36] obtain approximately 100% train accuracy but at most 90% test accuracy.
This is because, due to extreme SB, FCNs exclusively rely on the simpler noisy linear feature S and
remain invariant to all 7-slab features that have 100% predictive power.
To summarize, through theoretical analysis and extensive experiments on synthetic and image-based
datasets, we (a) establish that SB is extreme in nature across model architectures and datasets and (b)
show that extreme SB can result in poor OOD performance and adversarial vulnerability, even when
all simple and complex features have equal predictive power.
5 Extreme Simplicity Bias (SB) can hurt Generalization
In this section, we show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, extreme SB can result in suboptimal
generalization of SGD-trained models on the same data distribution as well. This is because exclusive
reliance on the simplest feature S can persist even when every complex feature in Sc has significantly
greater predictive power than S.
We verify this phenomenon on LˆMS-7 data defined in Section 3. Recall that LˆMS-7 has one noisy
linear coordinate S with 90% predictive power and multiple 7-slab coordinates Sc, each with 100%
predictive power. Note that our training sample size is large enough for FCNs of varying depth and
width that are trained on Sc only (i.e., after removing S from data) to attain 100% test accuracy.
However, when trained with SGD or Adam [36] on all features in LˆMS-7. (i.e., including S), FCNs
exhibit extreme SB and only rely on S, the noisy linear coordinate. Specifically, as shown in Table 2,
the train, test, and {S, Sc }-randomized accuracies collectively show that FCNs (a) exclusively rely on
(and overfit to) the noisy linear feature and (b) consequently suffer 10% generalization error.
To summarize, the mere presence of a simple-but-noisy feature significantly degrades generalization
because of extreme SB. In Appendix D, we additionally show that (a) this phenomenon holds on
other datasets, (b) increasing learning rate does not improve generalization on LˆMS-7 data, and (c)
deeper models exhibit stronger bias towards noisy-but-simple features.
6 Conclusion and Discussion
We investigated Simplicity Bias (SB) in SGD-trained neural networks (NNs) using synthetic and
image-based datasets that (a) incorporate a precise notion of feature simplicity, (b) are amenable
to theoretical analysis and (c) capture subtleties of trained NNs in practice. We first showed that
one-hidden-layer ReLU NNs provably exhibit SB. Then, we empirically demonstrated that SB is
extreme in practice and leads to poor OOD performance and adversarial vulnerability. We also
showed that, contrary to conventional wisdom, extreme SB can in fact hurt generalization.
Can we mitigate SB? It is natural to wonder if any modifications to the standard training procedure
can help in mitigating extreme SB and its adverse consequences. In Appendix E, we show that well-
studied approaches for improving generalization and adversarial robustness—ensemble methods and
adversarial training—do not mitigate SB. Specifically, when datasets have multiple simple features
(e.g., multiple linear coordinates in LMS-5 or multiple 5-Slab coordinates in MS-(5,7)), ensembles
of independently trained models mitigate SB to some extent by aggregating predictions based on
multiple simple features. However, the resulting ensemble remains invariant to all complex features:
5-Slabs in LMS-5 and 7-Slabs in MS-(5,7). Our results suggest that the generalization improvements
using ensemble models in practice stem from combining multiple simple-but-noisy features (such as
color, texture) and not by learning complex features (such as shape). Similarly, adversarial training
increases margin (and hence adversarial robustness) to some extent by combining multiple simplest
features but does not achieve maximum adversarial robustness since the resulting models are still
invariant to all complex features.
Our results collectively motivate the need for new algorithms that avoid the pitfalls of extreme SB.
Additionally, our proposed datasets capture the key aspects of training neural networks on real world
data, while being amenable to theoretical analysis and controlled experiments, and can act as an
effective testbed for evaluating new algorithmic approaches aimed at avoiding the pitfalls of SB.
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Broader Impact
Our work is foundational in nature and seeks to improve our understanding of neural networks. We
do not foresee any significant societal consequences in the short term. However, in the long term, we
believe that a concrete understanding of deep learning phenomena is essential to develop reliable
deep learning systems for practical applications that have societal impact.
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Appendices
The supplementary material is organized as follows. We first discuss additional related work and
provide experiment details in Section 2 and Appendix B respectively. In Appendix C, we provide
additional experiments to further validate the extreme nature of Simplicity Bias (SB). Then, in Ap-
pendix D, we present additional experiments to show that extreme SB can hurt generalization. Finally,
we provide the proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix F.
A Additional Related Work
In this section, we provide a more thorough discussion of relevant work related to the implicit bias of
SGD, margin-based generalization bounds, adversarial robustness, and out-of-distribution (OOD)
examples.
Implicit bias of stochastic gradient descent : Brutzkus et al. [8] shows that neural networks trained
with SGD provably generalize on linearly separable data. Recent works [62, 33] also analyze
the limiting direction of gradient descent on logistic regression with linearly separable and non-
separable data respectively; Gunasekar et al. [23] proves similar results for linear convolutional
networks. Empirical findings [47, 41] provide further evidence to suggest that neural networks
trained using SGD generalize well because SGD learns models of increasing complexity over time.
A few recent works have investigated the implicit bias of SGD on non-linearly separable data for
linear classifiers [33] and infinite width two layer NNs [13], in both cases showing convergence to
maximum margin classifiers in appropriate spaces. As discussed previously, we believe that this
implicit bias of SGD (towards simplicity) can in fact be a challenge for learning robust large-margin
classifiers as it is naturally biased towards simple, small-margin and feature-impoverished classifiers
at the cost of feature-dense, large-margin classifiers. Our result in Theorem 1 exhibits this issue in a
stylized setting.
Margin-based generalization bounds: Building up on the classical work of [3], recent works try to
obtain tighter generalization bounds for neural networks in terms of normalized margin [4, 48, 18, 21].
Here, margin is defined as the difference in the probability of the true label and the largest probability
of the incorrect labels. While these bounds seem to capture generalization of neural networks at a
coarse level, it has been argued [46] that these approaches may be incapable of fully explaining the
generalization ability of neural networks. Furthermore, it is unclear if the notion of model complexity
used in these works, based on Lipschitz constant, captures generalization ability accurately. In any
case, our results suggest that due to extreme simplicity bias (SB), even if a formulation captures both
margin and model complexity accurately, current optimization techniques may not be able to find
the optimal solution in terms of generalization and robustness-, as they are strongly biased towards
small-margin classifiers that exclusively rely on the simplest features.
Adversarial Defenses: Neural networks trained using standard procedures such as SGD are ex-
tremely vulnerable [22] to -bound adversarial attacks such as FGSM [22], PGD [40], CW [11],
and Momentum [17]; Unrestricted attacks [7, 19] can significantly degrade model performance as
well. Defense strategies based on heuristics such as feature squeezing [76], denoising [75], en-
coding [10], specialized nonlinearities [77] and distillation [53] have had limited success against
stronger attacks [2]. On the other hand, standard adversarial training [40] and its variants such
as [79] are fairly effective on datasets such as MNIST, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. However, on larger
datasets such as ImageNet, these methods have limited success [60]; recent attempts [73, 60] that
make adversarial training faster do not improve robustness either. In Appendix E, we show that `2
adversarial training on synthetic datasets can improve robustness by some extent but it is unable to
learn optimal large-margin `2-robust classifiers.
Detecting OOD Examples: Neural networks trained using standard training procedures tend to rely
on low-level features and spurious correlations and hence exhibit brittleness to benign distributional
changes to the data. Recent works thus aim to detect OOD examples using generative models [54],
statistical tests [56], and model confidence scores [28, 38, 37]. Our experiments in Section 4 that
validate extreme SB in practice also show that detectors that directly or indirectly rely on model
scores to detect OOD examples may not work well as SGD-trained neural networks can exhibit
complete invariance to predictive-but-complex features.
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B Experiment Details
In this section, we provide additional details on the datasets, models, optimization methods and
training hyperparameters used in the paper.
One-dimensional Building Blocks: We first describe the data generation process underlying each
building block: linear, noisy linear, and k-slab. Then, we introduce a noisy version of the 5-slab
block, which we later use in Appendix D.
• Linear(γ,B): The linear block is parameterized by the effective margin γ and width B. The
distribution first samples a label y ∈ {−1, 1} uniformly at random, and then given y, x is sampled
as follows: x = y(Bγ + (B −Bγ) · U(0, 1), where U(0, 1) is the uniform distribution on [0, 1].
• NoisyLinear(γ,B, p): The noisy linear block is parameterized by effective margin γ, width B, and
noise parameter p. Linear classifiers can attain the optimal classification accuracy of 1− p/2. Given
label y ∈ {−1, 1} sampled uniformly at random, x is sampled as follows:
x =
{
y(Bγ + (B −Bγ) · U(0, 1) w.p. p
U(−γ, γ) w.p. 1−p
• Slab(γ,B, k): The k-slab block is parameterized by effective margin γ, width B, and number of
slabs k. We use k ∈ {3, 5, 7} in our paper. The width of each slab, wk = 2B(1− (k − 1)γ)/k, in
the k-slab block is chosen such that the farthest points are at −B and B. For example, given label
y ∈ {−1, 1} and random sign z ∈ {−1, 1} sampled unif. at random, we can sample x from a 3-slab
block as follows:
x =
{
z( 12w3 · U(0, 1)) if y = −1
z( 12w3 + 2Bγ + w3 · U(0, 1)) if y = +1
For k-slab blocks with k ∈ {5, 7}, the probability of sampling from the two slabs (one on each
side) that are farthest away from the origin are 1/4 and 1/8 respectively to ensure that the variance
of instances in positive and negative classes, x+ and x−, are equal.
• NoisySlab(γ,B, k, p): Analogous to the noisy linear block, the noisy variant of the k-slab block
is additionally parameterized by a noise parameter p. In this setting, a (k−1)-piecewise linear
classifier can attain the optimal classification accuracy of 1− p/2. For example, For example, given
label y ∈ {−1, 1} and random sign z ∈ {−1, 1} sampled uniformly at random, we can sample x
from a p-noisy 3-slab block as follows:
x =

{
z( 12w3 · U(0, 1)) if y = −1
z( 12w3 + 2Bγ + w3 · U(0, 1)) if y = +1
w.p. 1− p
z( 12w3 + (2Bγ − 12w3) · U(0, 1)) w.p. p
Datasets: We now outline the default hyperparameters for generating the synthetic datasets used
in the paper, provide additional details on the LSN dataset, and introduce two additional synthetic
datasets as well as multiple versions of the MNIST-CIFAR dataset (i.e., with different class pairs).
• Synthetic Dataset Hyperparameters: Recall that we use four d-dimensional synthetic datasets—
LMS-k, LˆMS-k, MS-(5,7), and MS-5—wherein each coordinate corresponds to one of the building
blocks described above. Unless mentioned otherwise, for all four datasets, we set the effec-
tive margin parameter γ = 0.1, width parameter B = 1, and noise parameter p = 0.2 in all
blocks/coordinates. Also recall that each dataset comprises at most one “simple" feature S and
multiple independent complex features Sc. In our experiments, all datasets have sample sizes that
are large enough for all models considered in the paper to learn complex features Sc and attain
optimal test accuracy, even in the absence of S; we use sample sizes of 50000 for LMS-5 and MS-5
and 100000 for LˆMS-7 and MS-(5,7) datasets.
• LSN Dataset: Recall that the LSN dataset (described in Section 3) is a stylized version of the LMS-k
that is amenable to theoretical analysis. In LSN, conditioned on the label y, the first and second
coordinates of x are singleton linear and 3-slab blocks: linear and 3-slab blocks have support on
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{−1, 1} and {−1, 0, 1} respectively. The remaining coordinates are standard gaussians and not
predictive of the label. Each data point (xi, yi) ∈ <d × {−1, 1} can be sampled as follows:
yi = ±1, w.p. 1/2, εi = ±1, w.p. 1/2,
xi1 = yi (Linear coordinate),
xi2 =
(yi + 1
2
)
εi (Slab coordinate),
xi,3:d ∼ N (0, Id−2) (d−2 Noise coordinates).
• Additional Datasets: We now introduce MˆS-(5,7), the noisy version of MS-(5,7), and three
MNIST-CIFAR datasets, each with different MNIST and CIFAR10 classes.
– MˆS-(5,7): Noisy 5-slab and multiple noiseless 7-slab blocks; the first coordinate is a noisy
5-slab block and the remaining d−1 coordinates are independent 7-slab blocks. Note that this
dataset comprises a noisy-but-simpler 5-slab block and multiple noiseless 7-slab blocks; a
6-piecewise linear classifier can attain 100% accuracy by learn any 7-slab block.
– MNIST-CIFAR datasets: Recall that images in the MNIST-CIFAR datasets are concatenations
of MNIST and CIFAR10 images. We introduce additional variants of the MNIST-CIFAR using
different class pairs to show that our results in the paper are robust to the exact choice of pairs:
Datasets Class −1 Class +1
MNIST CIFAR10 MNIST CIFAR10
MNIST-CIFAR:A Digit 0 Automobile Digit 1 Truck
MNIST-CIFAR:B Digit 1 Automobile Digit 4 Truck
MNIST-CIFAR:C Digit 0 Airplane Digit 1 Ship
Table 3: Three MNIST-CIFAR datasets. We use MNIST-CIFAR:A in the paper. In MNIST-CIFAR:B,
we use different MNIST classes: digits 1 and 4. In MNIST-CIFAR:C, we use different CIFAR10 classes:
airplane and ship. Our results in Section 4 hold on all three MNIST-CIFAR datasets.
Models: Here, we briefly describe the models (and its abbreviations) used in the paper. We use
fully-connected (FCNs), convolutional (CNNs), and sequential neural networks (GRUs [15]) on synthetic
datasets. Abbreviations (w, d)-FCN denotes FCN with width w and depth d, (f, k, d)-CNN denotes
d-layer CNNs with f filters of size k × k in each layer with and (h, l, d)-GRU denotes d-layer d-layer
GRU with input dimensionality l and hidden state dimensionality h. On MNIST-CIFAR, we train
MobileNetV2 [57], GoogLeNet [65], ResNet50 [26] and DenseNet121 [30].
Training Procedures: Unless mentioned otherwise, we use the following hyperparameters for
standard training and adversarial training on synthetic and MNIST-CIFAR data:
• Standard Training: On synthetic datasets, we use Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) with (fixed)
learning rate 0.1 and batch size 256, and `2 regularization 5 · 10−7. On MNIST-CIFAR datasets, we
use SGD with initial learning rate 0.05 with decay factor of 0.2 every 30 epochs, momentum 0.9
and `2 regularization 5 · 10−5. We do not use data augmentation. We run all models for at most
500 epochs and stop early if the training loss goes below 10−3.
• Adversarial Training: We use the same SGD hyperparameters (as described above) on synthetic
and MNIST-CIFAR datasets. We use Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) Adversarial Training [40]
to adversarially train models. We use learning rate 0.1 and 40 iterations to generate `2 & `∞
perturbations
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C Additional Results on the Extreme Nature of Simplicity Bias (SB)
Recall that Section 4 of the paper establishes the extreme nature of SB: If all features have full
predictive power, NNs rely exclusively on the simplest feature S and remain invariant to all complex
features Sc—in Section 4 of the paper. Now, we further validate the extreme nature of SB across
model architectures, datasets, optimizers, activation functions and regularization.
C.1 Effect of Model Architecture
In this section, we supplement our results in Section 4 of the paper by showing that extreme simplicity
bias (SB) persists across several model architectures and on synthetic as well as image-based datasets.
In Table 4, we present {S,Sc }-Randomized AUCs for FCNs, CNNs and GRUs with depth {1,2}
trained on LMS and MS-(5,7) datasets and state-of-the-art CNNs trained on MNIST-CIFAR:A. While
the Sc-randomized AUC equals 1.00 (perfect classification), we see that the S-randomized AUCs are
approximately 0.5 for all models. This is because all models essentially only rely on the simplest
feature S and remain invariant to all complex features Sc, even though all features have equal
predictive power.
Dataset Set S Set Sc Model
Randomized AUC
Set S Set Sc
LMS-5 Linear 5-Slabs
(100,1)-FCN 0.50 1.00
(100,2)-FCN 0.49 1.00
(32,7,1)-CNN 0.50 1.00
(32,7,2)-CNN 0.50 1.00
(100,10,1)-GRU 0.51 1.00
(100,10,2)-GRU 0.50 1.00
MS-(5,7) 5-Slab 7-Slabs
(100,1)-FCN 0.50 1.00
(100,1)-FCN 0.50 1.00
(32,7,1)-CNN 0.50 1.00
(32,7,2)-CNN 0.50 1.00
(100,10,1)-GRU 0.50 1.00
(100,10,2)-GRU 0.50 1.00
MNIST-CIFAR:A MNIST
block
CIFAR
block
MobileNetV2 0.52 1.00
GoogLeNet 0.51 1.00
ResNet50 0.50 1.00
DenseNet121 0.52 1.00
Table 4: Extreme SB across models trained on synthetic and image-based datasets show that all
models exclusively rely on the simplest feature S and remain completely invariant to all complex
features Sc
C.2 Effect of MNIST-CIFAR Class Pairs
In this section, we supplement our results on MNIST-CIFAR (in Section 4) in order to show that
extreme SB observed in MobileNetV2 [57], GoogLeNet [65], ResNet50 [26] and DenseNet121 [30]
does not depend on the exact choice of MNIST and CIFAR10 class pairs used to construct the
MNIST-CIFAR datasets. To do so, we evaluate the MNIST-randomized and CIFAR10-randomized
metrics of the aforementioned models on three datasets–MNIST-CIFAR:A, MNIST-CIFAR:B,
MNIST-CIFAR:C—described in Appendix B.
Model MNIST-CIFAR:A AUCs MNIST-CIFAR:B AUCs MNIST-CIFAR:C AUCs
Standard
CIFAR10
Randomized
MNIST
Randomized Standard
CIFAR10
Randomized
MNIST
Randomized Standard
CIFAR10
Randomized
MNIST
Randomized
MobileNetV2 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 0.53± 0.01 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 0.53± 0.02 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 0.50± 0.01
GoogLeNet 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 0.52± 0.02 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 0.50± 0.01 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 0.53± 0.01
ResNet50 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 0.50± 0.01 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 0.51± 0.01 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 0.50± 0.03
DenseNet121 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 0.53± 0.02 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 0.52± 0.01 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 0.54± 0.01
Table 5: (Extreme SB in three MNIST-CIFAR datasets) Standard and randomized AUCs of four
state-of-the-art CNNs trained on three MNIST-CIFAR datasets. The AUC values collectively indicate
that all models exclusively rely on the MNIST block.
Table 5 presents the standard, MNIST-randomized and CIFAR10-randomized AUC values of Mo-
bileNetV2, GoogLeNet, ResNet50 and DenseNet121 on three MNIST-CIFAR datasets. We observe
that randomizing over the simpler MNIST block is sufficient to fully degrade the predictive power
of all models; for instance, randomizing the MNIST block drops the AUC values of ResNet50 from
1.0 to 0.5 (i.e., equivalent to random classifier). However, randomizing the CIFAR10 block has no
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effect—standard AUC and CIFAR10-randomized AUCs equal 1.0. In contrast, an ideal classifier that
relies on MNIST & CIFAR10 would attain non-trivial AUC even when the MNIST block is randomized.
C.3 Effect of Optimizers and Activation Functions
Now, we study the effect of activation function and optimizer on extreme SB. That is, can the usage
of different activation functions and optimizer encourage trained neural networks to rely on complex
features Sc in addition to the simplest feature S?
Activation
Function
LMS-7 MS-(5,7)
SGD Adam RMSProp SGD Adam RMSProp
ReLU 0.499± 0.001 0.497± 0.003 0.502± 0.004 0.499± 0.003 0.499± 0.004 0.496± 0.004
Leaky ReLU 0.501± 0.001 0.497± 0.003 0.501± 0.005 0.499± 0.005 0.498± 0.002 0.498± 0.005
PReLU 0.500± 0.004 0.500± 0.003 0.501± 0.004 0.501± 0.004 0.496± 0.003 0.499± 0.002
Tanh 0.495± 0.001 0.502± 0.004 0.495± 0.004 0.498± 0.004 0.499± 0.004 0.498± 0.002
Table 6: (Effect of activation function and optimizers) (100, 2)-FCNs with multiple activation
functions—ReLU, Leaky ReLU [39], PReLU [27], and Tanh—trained on LMS-5 data using common
first-order optimization methods—SGD, Adam [36], and RMSProp [67]—exhibit extreme SB.
Table 6 presents the S-randomized AUCs of (100, 2)-FCNs with multiple activation functions—
ReLU, Leaky ReLU [39], PReLU [27], and Tanh—trained on LMS-7 and MS-(5,7) datasets using
multiple commonly-used optimizers: SGD, Adam [36],and RMSProp [67]. We observe that for all
combinations of activations and optimizers, trained FCNs still only rely on simplest feature S; S-
randomized and Sc-randomized AUCs are approximately 0.50 and 1.0 respectively for all optimizers
and activation functions. Therefore, in addition to SGD, commonly used first-order optimization
methods such as Adam and RMSProp cannot jointly learn large-margin classifiers that rely on learn
slab-structured features in the presence of a noisy linear structure. To summarize, the experiment
in Appendix C.2 shows that simply altering the choice of optimizer and activation function does
not have any effect on extreme SB. Similar to the experiments in Section 4 of the paper, all models
exclusively rely on simplest feature S and remain invariant to complex features Sc.
C.4 Effect of `2 Regularization and Dropout
In this section, we use SGD-trained FCNs trained on LMS-7 data to examine the extent to which
Dropout [63] and `2 regularization alters the extreme nature of SB. Specifically, we use Dropout
probability parameter {0.0, 0.05, 0.10} and `2 regularization parameters {0.01, 0.001} when training
FCNs with width 100 and depth {1, 2} on LMS-7 data using SGD. In Table 7, we show the standard
and Sc-randomized AUCs equal 1.00 (perfect classification), whereas the S-randomized AUCs are
approximately 0.5 for all models. Applying Dropout while reducing the amount of `2 regularization
has negligible effect on the extreme nature of SB observed in the synthetic or image-based datasets.
Model Dropout Standard AUC S-Randomized AUC S
c-Randomized AUC
λ = 10−2 λ = 10−4 λ = 10−2 λ = 10−4 λ = 10−2 λ = 10−4
(100,1)-FCN
0.00 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 0.50± 0.00 0.50± 0.01 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00
0.05 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 0.50± 0.00 0.50± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00
0.10 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 0.50± 0.00 0.50± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00
(100,2)-FCN
0.00 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 0.50± 0.00 0.50± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00
0.05 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 0.50± 0.00 0.50± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00
0.10 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 0.50± 0.00 0.50± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00
Table 7: Dropout and `2 regularization have no effect on extreme SB of FCNs trained on LMS-7
datasets. The standard and {S,Sc }-randomized AUC values of (100,1)-FCNs and (100,2)-FCNs
collectively indicate that the models still exclusively latch on to S (linear block) and remain invariant
to Sc (7-slab blocks).
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D Additional Results on the Effect of Extreme SB on Generalization
Recall that in Section 5 of the paper, we showed that, contrary to conventional wisdom, extreme
SB can result in suboptimal generalization of SGD-trained models on the same data distribution as
well. In this section, we present additional experiments to concretely validate the aforementioned
phenomenon. First, we analyze the effect of `2 regularization and learning rate on models trained on
LˆMS-k (noisy linear & multiple noiseless k-slab blocks) data. Second, we investigate the effect of
model depth and the amount of noise in “simple" features on generalization in the context of extreme
SB. Third, we show that SGD-trained fully-connected networks trained on MˆS-(5,7) data (noisy
5-slab & multiple 7-slabs) exhibit suboptimal generalization performance as well.
D.1 Effect of `2 Regularization
Now, we show that increasing the `2 regularization hyper-parameter λ has no effect on extreme SB or
its effect on generalization. SGD-trained FCNs continue to exclusively latch on to the noisy linear
block and consequently attain suboptimal generalization.
`2 regularization
LˆMS-7 MS-7
Test Accuracy Train Accuracy Test Accuracy Train Accuracy
λ = 10−6 0.896± 0.003 0.995± 0.004 1.000± 0.000 1.000± 0.000
λ = 10−5 0.896± 0.001 0.991± 0.003 1.000± 0.000 1.000± 0.000
λ = 10−4 0.896± 0.001 0.990± 0.002 1.000± 0.000 1.000± 0.000
λ = 10−3 0.895± 0.002 0.937± 0.002 0.504± 0.002 0.503± 0.003
λ = 10−2 0.898± 0.001 0.899± 0.000 0.503± 0.001 0.501± 0.002
Table 8: (Effect of `2 regularization) Increasing the `2 regularization parameter λ from 10−6 to 10−2
reduces the extent to which FCNs overfit to the noisy linear component. However, increasing λ does
not make FCNs learn the 7-slab components and obtain 100% test accuracy—all models continue to
overfit to the noisy linear component and obtain 90% test accuracy.
As shown in Table 8, increasing λ from 10−6 to 10−2 does not enable FCNs to learn the 7-slab blocks
and obtain 100% test accuracy—all models continue to overfit to the noisy linear component and
obtain 90% test accuracy. On the contrary, we observe that increasing λ to 10−3 or 10−2 leads to
severe underfitting, which prevents models from learning the 7-slab block in MS-7 data and thus
attaining 100% test accuracy.
D.2 Effect of Learning Rate
We now evaluate the effect of learning rate on the generalization of (100,2)-FCNs trained with SGD
on LˆMS-5 (noisy linear + multiple 5-slab coordinates) and LˆMS-7 (noisy linear + multiple 7-slab
coordinates). Recall that in this setting, both datasets, LˆMS-5 and LˆMS-7, have a single noisy linear
coordinate that has 10% noise whereas all k-slab coordinates have no noise. Therefore, the optimal
accuracy attainable by any model that relies only on the noisy linear coordinate is 95%. On the other
hand, models can attain 100% accuracy by learning one or more k-slab coordinates.
Figure 5: The effect of learning rate on the generalization of (100,2)-FCNs trained with SGD
on LˆMS-5 (noisy linear + multiple 5-slab coordinates) and LˆMS-7 (noisy linear + multiple 7-slab
coordinates) datasets. Increasing the learning rate results in models that generalize well on the
LˆMS-5 dataset. However, models trained on the LˆMS-7 with large learning rates attain suboptimal
generalization.
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LˆMS-5 data: We first consider the effect of learning rate using the LˆMS-5 dataset with 50000 samples.
In this setting, while the noisy linear coordinate does not have perfect predictive power, the remaining
5-slab coordinates are capable of perfect prediction. (100, 2)-FCNs trained on the dataset comprising
5-slab coordinates only (i.e., without noisy linear coordinate) achieves perfect accuracy with the
same sample size. When we train the same model on the LˆMS-5 dataset (i.e., with the noisy linear
coordinate), we observe that SGD-trained models learned with small learning rate end up having
only 94% test accuracy. However, the test accuracy of models trained with larger learning rates
approaches 100%, as shown by the blue line in Figure 5. The two-dimensional projections of the
decision boundaries in Figure 5 show that models learned with a small learning rate (LR) rely almost
exclusively on the noisy linear coordinate, whereas those learned with large LR rely on the noisy
linear and 5-slab coordinates.
LˆMS-7 data: However, the effect of LR disappears when we consider the LˆMS-7 dataset. The
orange line in Figure 5 shows that increasing the learning rate from 0.01 to 2.0 has no effect on
the generalization of (100,2)-FCNs trained on the LˆMS-7 dataset. All models attain suboptimal
generalization by latching on to the simple-but-noisy linear coordinate instead of learning the more
complex 7-slab coordinates.
To summarize, these results demonstrate that when the simplest feature has less predictive power than
the more complex features, larger LR may help offset extreme SB and lead to better generalization,
as observed with the LˆMS-5 dataset. However, more generally, as observed with the LˆMS-7 dataset,
simply increasing the learning rate may be insufficient to mitigate SB and its adverse effect on
generalization.
D.3 Effect of Model Depth and Noise in LˆMS-7
In this section, we evaluate the effect of model depth on extreme SB and generalization using SGD-
trained FCNs on LˆMS-7 data. In particular, we evaluate the generalization of FCNs with width 100 and
depth {1, 2, 3} by varying the noise parameter p to control the noise in the noisy linear coordinate.
We consider the LˆMS-7 dataset with 70000 samples. Recall that when noise parameter p > 0, the
noisy linear coordinate does not have perfect predictive power; the optimal accuracy attainable is
1− p/2. On the other hand, all 7-slab coordinates are capable of perfect prediction. Now, we vary
the noise parameter p from 0.0 (linearly separable) to 1.0 (zero predictive power) and train FCNs
of depth {1, 2, 3} on the resulting LˆMS-7 dataset. The standard accuracy and linear-randomized
AUCs in Figure 6 show that when p ≤ 0.2, all models exclusively latch on to the noise linear due to
extreme SB and hence suffer 10% generalization error. More surprisingly, FCNs with depth 3 continue
to exclusively rely on the noisy linear coordinate even when p = 0.8 and rely on noiseless 7-slab
coordinates only when p > 0.8. Consequently, (100,3)-FCNs can exhibit generalization error of up
to 40%.
To summarize, even though the data has complex features that can be quickly learned with the same
sample complexity, model and algorithm, the presence of a noisier-but-simpler feature leads to trained
models that overfit onto this feature, which subsequently leads to suboptimal generalization. We also
observe that the deeper FCNs are more susceptible to simple-but-noisy features.
Figure 6: Effect of noise parameter p and FCN depth on generalization. Subplots (a) & (b) depict
standard accuracy & S-randomized AUCs of FCNs with varying depth trained on LˆMS-7 data.
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D.4 Generalization in Noisy MS-(5,7)
Recall that in Section 5 of the paper, we showed that FCNs trained on LˆMS-7 data (with 20% noise
only in the linear block) obtain 90% test accuracy, even though the optimal FCN classifier can obtain
100% accuracy by relying on one or or more (noiseless) 7-slab blocks. Now, we show that extreme
SB can hurt generalization even in a non-linear setting. We consider the MˆS-(5,7) data that has a
relatively simple 5-slab block (with 20% noise) and multiple 7-slab blocks that have no noise.
FCN Width FCN Depth
Standard Test Accuracy
MS-7 MˆS-(5,7)
100
1 0.999± 0.000 0.907± 0.026
2 0.999± 0.001 0.902± 0.037
3 1.000± 0.003 0.888± 0.002
300
1 0.988± 0.008 0.885± 0.003
2 0.974± 0.010 0.915± 0.020
3 1.000± 0.000 0.892± 0.003
Table 9: (Generalization on MˆS-(5,7) data) FCNs have test accuracy ≈ 90% on MˆS-(5,7) data.
In contrast, FCNs obtain 100% test accuracy on MS-(5,7) data (i.e. without noisy 5-slab block is
removed) with the same sample size.
As shown in Table 9, FCNs with depth {1, 2, 3} and width {100, 300} trained using SGD on 50-
dimensional MˆS-(5,7) data (with 20% noise) only obtain ≈ 90% accuracy, even though the optimal
FCN classifier can obtain 100% accuracy by learning one or more 7-slab structures. Due to extreme
SB, The mere presence of a noisy 5-slab block that is “easier" to learn than 7-slab blocks brings down
the accuracy by 10%. Therefore, the tendency of SGD to favor simple-but-noisy feature S even if they
are less predictive than every complex feature in Sc can result in suboptimal generalization, More
broadly, this experiment also indicates that (1) noisy 5-slab blocks are easier to learn than noiseless
7-slab block and (2) the proposed notion of feature simplicity extends beyond linearity.
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E Can we mitigate Simplicity Bias?
In this section, we investigate whether standard approaches for improving generalization error and
adversarial robustness—ensembles and adversarial training—help in mitigating SB.
E.1 Ensemble Methods
We now study the extent to which ensembles mitigate SB and its adverse effect on generalization.
Specifically, we evaluate the performance of ensembles of fully-connected networks (FCNs) that are
trained on two datasets: LˆMS-7 and MS-5. Recall that the LˆMS-7 data comprises one simple-but-noisy
linear coordinate and multiple relatively complex 7-slab coordinates that have no noise, whereas
MS-5 data comprises multiple noiseless 5-slab coordinates only.
(a) (b)
Figure 7: Ensembles improve performance on MS-5 data that comprises features with equal predictive
power and simplicity. However, as shown in (a), ensembles do not improve performance on LˆMS-7
data that has a simple-but-noisy linear coordinate that has less predictive power than than the 7-slab
coordinates; this is because individual FCNs trained on LˆMS-7 data exclusively rely on the noisy linear
coordinate and consequently misclassify the same set of instances, as shown in subplot (b).
To better highlight the effect of ensembles on generalization, we choose a sample size (for both
datasets) such that individual models (a) overfit to training data (i.e., non-zero generalization gap)
but (b) still attain non-trivial test accuracy. We now discuss the performance of ensembles of
independently trained models on MS-5 and LˆMS-7 datasets:
• MS-5 data: Recall that MS-5 data comprises multiple independent 5-slab blocks, one in each
coordinate, that have equal simplicity and predictive power. Thus, since all features have equal
simplicity, independent SGD-trained (100,2)-FCN end up relying on different 5-slab coordinates
due to random initialization, as shown in Figure 7(b). As the training sample size is small, FCNs
overfit to the training data and attain approximately 75% test accuracy, as shown in Figure 7.
Consequently, as shown in Figure 7, ensembles of these models rely on all 5-slab coordinates
learned by the individual models and attain better test accuracy by aggregating model predictions
and averaging out overfitting. For example, Figure 7 shows that ensembles of size 5 and 10
improves generalization by approximately 15% and 20% respectively.
• LˆMS-7 data: Recall that LˆMS-5 data comprises one simple-but-noisy linear block (with 50%
noise) and multiple independent 7-slab blocks that have no noise. Now, due to extreme SB,
every independently trained FCN exclusively latches on (and overfits to) the simpler-but-noisy
linear block, as shown in Figure 7(b). As a result, all models collectively lack diversity and
essentially learn the same decision boundary because of extreme SB. Therefore, ensembles of these
models do not improve generalization because the independent models make misclassifications
on the same instances. As shown in Figure 7(a), ensembles of size 3, 5 and 10 do not improve
generalization—the test accuracy remains 75%.
The ensemble performance on MS-5 data indicates that when datasets have multiple equally simple
features, ensembles of independently trained models mitigate SB to some extent by aggregating
predictions of models that rely on simple features. Conversely, the ensemble performance on LˆMS-7
data suggests that when datasets comprise few features that the more noisy and less predictive than
the rest, ensembles may not improve generalization. Our results also suggest that the generalization
improvements using ensemble methods in practice may stem from combining multiple simple-but-
noisy features (such as color, texture) and not by learning complex features (such as shape).
E.2 Adversarial Training
We now investigate the extent to which adversarial training [40] mitigates SB and its adverse effect
on adversarial robustness through (100, 2)-FCNs (fully-connected network with 2 hidden layers and
100 hidden units in each layer) that are trained on two datasets: LMS-5 and MNIST-CIFAR. Recall
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that the LMS-5 data comprises one simple linear coordinate and multiple relatively complex 7-slab
coordinates, all of which have perfect predictive power whereas the MNIST-CIFAR data vertically
concatenates MNIST and CIFAR10 images; the simplest feature S is {linear} and {MNIST } in the
LMS-5 and MNIST-CIFAR datasets respectively.
• LMS-5 data: Figure 8(a) shows the standard (in blue), adversarial (in orange), and S-randomized
(in green) accuracies of `2 adversarially trained (100, 2)-FCNs. Since the margin in the linear
coordinate S is 0.2, any model that relies exclusively on S cannot achieve adversarial accuracy
of 1.0 beyond an `2 perturbation budget of 0.2/2 = 0.1. In fact, as shown in Figure 8(b), the
-robust accuracy (in red) of FCN trained using SGD (i.e., not adversarial training) starts to dip
sharply once the perturbation budget  is larger than 0.1. However, as shown by S-randomized
accuracy (in green) in Figure 8(a), the adversarially trained FCN continues to maintain -robust
accuracy of 1.0 until a perturbation budget of 0.5 by partially relying on the slab coordinates when
 > 0.1. Nevertheless, both, standard and -robust accuracies, drop to 0.50 (i.e., random chance)
once the perturbations are larger than 0.6. This is in stark contrast to the fact that (100, 2)-FCNs
are capable of fully relying on at least 25 of the 49 5-Slab coordinates (using 4 ReLUs for each
5-Slab coordinate) and hence are capable of achieving -robust accuracy of 1.0 all the way up to
perturbations of size 2.15.
Figure 8: Adversarially training (100,2)-FCNs on LMS-5: Subplot (a) demonstrates the standard
(in blue), -robust (in orange) and S-randomized (in green) accuracies of `2 adversarially trained
(100,2)-FCNs. Subplot (b) depicts the -robust accuracy (in red) of SGD-trained (100,2)-FCNs.
While adversarial training does improve the -robust accuracy when  < 0.6, it is unable to achieve
maximum possible adversarial robustness when  > 0.6 (See Appendix E.2 for more detail).
• MNIST-CIFAR data: Table 10 presents results of adversarially trained MobileNetV2, ResNet50
and DenseNet121 on MNIST-CIFAR dataset. Similar to what we observed with LMS-5 data, we
observe that while adversarial training does improve -robust over those of standard trained models,
it does not improve the reliance of learned models on the CIFAR10 block—adversarially trained
CNNs remain completely invariant to the CIFAR10 block even though it is almost fully predictive of
the label. Consequently, these results suggest that adversarial training does not achieve the best
-robust accuracy on the MNIST-CIFAR dataset.
To summarize, our experiments on LMS-5 and MNIST-CIFAR datasets show that while adversarial
training does improve the -robust accuracy over that of SGD-trained model, it (a) does not fully
mitigate SB and consequently (b) does not achieve maximum possible adversarial robustness.
Model `∞ budget ε
Test Accuracy -Robust Accuracy CIFAR10-Randomized Accuracy
Standard SGD `∞ Adv. Training Standard SGD `∞ Adv. Training Standard SGD `∞ Adv. Training
MobileNetV2 0.30 0.999± 0.001 0.999± 0.000 0.000± 0.000 0.991± 0.000 0.493± 0.005 0.493± 0.001
DenseNet121 0.30 1.000± 0.000 0.999± 0.000 0.000± 0.000 0.981± 0.003 0.494± 0.005 0.501± 0.003
ResNet50 0.30 1.000± 0.000 0.999± 0.001 0.001± 0.000 0.982± 0.002 0.501± 0.001 0.499± 0.002
Table 10: Adversarial training on MNIST-CIFAR: The table above presents standard, -robust and
CIFAR10-randomized accuracies for MobileNetV2, DenseNet121 and ResNet50 that are training use
standard SGD and adversarial training. While adversarial training significantly improves ε-robust
accuracy, it does not encourage models to learn complex features (CIFAR10 block in this case). The
CIFAR10-randomized accuracies indicate that aadversarially trained models do not mitigate extreme
SB, as they exclusively rely on the MNIST block.
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F Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, we first re-introduce the data distribution and theorem. Then, we describe the proof
sketch and notation, before moving on to the proof.
Linear-Slab-Noise (LSN) data: The LSN dataset is a stylized version of LMS-k that is amenable to
theoretical analysis. In LSN, conditioned on the label y, the first and second coordinates of x are
singleton linear and 3-slab blocks: linear and 3-slab blocks have support on {−1, 1} and {−1, 0, 1}
respectively. The remaining coordinates are standard gaussians and not predictive of the label. Each
data point (xi, yi) ∈ <d × {−1, 1} from LSN can be sampled as follows:
yi = ±1, w.p. 1/2, εi = ±1, w.p. 1/2,
xi1 = yi (Linear coordinate),
xi2 =
(yi + 1
2
)
εi (Slab coordinate),
xi,3:d ∼ N (0, Id−2) (d−2 Noise coordinates).
According to Theorem 1 (re-stated), one-hidden-layer ReLU neural networks trained with standard
mini-batch gradient descent (GD) on the LSN dataset provably learns a classifier that exclusively relies
on the “simple" linear coordinate, thus exhibiting simplicity bias at the cost of margin.
Theorem 1. Let f(x) =
∑k
j=1 vj · ReLU(
∑d
i=1 wi,jxi) denote a one-hidden-layer neural network
with k hidden units and ReLU activations. Set vj = ±1/√k w.p. 1/2 ∀j ∈ [k]. Let {(xi, yi)}mi=1
denote i.i.d. samples from LSN where m ∈ [cd2, dα/c] for some α > 2. Then, given d > Ω(√k log k)
and initial wij ∼ N (0, 1dk log4 d ), after O(1) iterations, mini-batch gradient descent (over w) with
hinge loss, constant step size, mini-batch size Θ(m), satisfies:
• Test error is at most 1/poly(d)
• The learned weights of hidden units wij satisfy:
|w1j | = 2√
k
(
1− c√
log d
)
+O
(
1√
dk log d
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Linear Coordinate
, |w2,j | = O
(
1√
dk log d
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
3-Slab Coordinate
, ‖w3:d,j‖ = O
(
1√
k log d
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
d−2 Noise Coordinates
with probability greater than 1− 1poly(d) . Note that c is a universal constant.
Proof Sketch Since the number of iterations t = O(1), we partition the dataset into t minibatches
each of size n := m/t samples. This means that each iteration uses a fresh batch of n samples and
the t iterations together form a single pass over the data. The overall outline of the proof is as follows.
If the step size is η, then for t . 4η iterations, with probability ≥ 1− 1poly(d) ,
• Lemma 2 shows that the hinge loss is “active" (i.e., yf(x) < 1) for all data points in a given batch.
• Under this condition, we derive closed-form expressions for population gradients in Lemmas 4, 5
and 6.
• Lemma 1 uses the above lemmas to establish precise estimates of the linear, slab and noise
coordinates for all iterations until t.
The proof is organized as follows. Appendix F.1 presents the main lemmas that will directly lead to
Theorem 1. Appendix F.2 derives closed form expressions for population gradients and Appendix F.3
presents auxiliary lemmas that are useful in the main proofs.
Notation Recall that f(x) =
∑k
j=1 vj · ReLU(
∑d
i=1 wijxi) = v
TReLU(WTx) where W ∈ Rd×k
and v ∈ Rk. Note that wi = [w1i w2i, · · ·wdi]T is the ith column in W . Let w¯i and x¯j denote the
w3:d,i and x3:d,j respectively. Also, let Sn = {(xi, yi)}ni=1 denote a set of n i.i.d. points randomly
sampled from LSN. For simplicity, we also assume |{i : vi = 1/√k}| = |{i : vi = −1/√k}| = k/2. We
can now define the loss function as Lf (Sn) = 1/n
∑n
i `(xi, yi), where `(x, y) = max(0, 1− yf(x))
denotes the hinge loss. For notational simplicity, we use X = µ± δ and |X−µ| ≤ δ interchangeably.
Also let ϕ and φ denote the probability density function and cumulative distribution function of
standard normal distribution.
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Proof of Theorem 1. The proof directly follows from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. In Lemma 1, we show
that the weights in the linear coordinate are Ω(
√
d) larger than the weights in the slab and noise
coordinates. Applying Lemma 1 at tˆ = b 4η (1− cn√log d )c gives the following result:
w
(tˆ)
1i
(a)
=
2√
k
(1− cn√
log d
) +O(
1√
dk log d
) and |w(tˆ)2i |
(a)
= O(
1√
dk log d
) and ||w¯(tˆ)i |
(a)
= O(
1√
k log d
)
where (a) is due to c0(1 + cˆ)t ≤ c0ecˆt ≤ c0e1 = O(1).
The 0− 1 error of the function f at timestep tˆ is small as well, because we can directly use Lemma 2
to get Pr(yf(x) < 0) = 2/c3d6. Therefore, the 0− 1 error is at most 2c3d6 = O( 1d6 ). 
F.1 Proof by Induction
In this section, we use proof by induction to show that for the first t = O(1/η) steps, (1) the hinge
loss is “active" for all data points (Lemma 2) and (2) hidden layer weights in the linear coordinate are
Ω(
√
d) larger than the hidden layer weights in the slab and noise coordinates (Lemma 1).
Lemma 1. Let |Sn| ∈ [cd2, dα/c] and initialization wij ∼ N (0, 1/dk log2 d). Also let cˆ = η/4, c0 = 2
and cn = 5
√
αc0(1 + cˆ)
t. Then, for all t ≤ 4η (1 − cn/
√
log d), d ≥ exp((8cn/η)2), √d/log3(d) >
24
√
k/c0c and i ∈ [k], w.p. greater than 1−O( 1d2 ), we have:
yif(xi) ≤ 1 ∀(xi, yi) ∈ Sn (1)
w
(t)
1i =
tηvi
2
± c0(1 + cˆ)
t
√
dk log d
(2)
|w(t)2i | ≤
c0(1 + cˆ)
t
√
dk log d
(3)
||w¯(t)||2 ≤ c0(1 + cˆ)
t
√
k log d
(4)
Proof. First, we prove that equations (2), (3) & (4) hold at initialization (i.e., t = 0) with high
probability. Using 7 and 1:
max
i∈{1,2}
max
j≤k
|wij | ≤ 2√
dk log d
and max
i≤k
||w¯i|| ≤ 2√
k log d
w.p. 1− 2
d4
Therefore, w1i =
(0)ηvi
2 ± c0(1+cˆ)
0
√
dk log d
and |w2i| ≤ c0(1+cˆ)
0
√
dk log d
and ||w¯i|| ≤ c0(1+cˆ)
0
√
k log d
. Since equations
(2), (3) & (4) hold at t = 0, we can use Lemma 2 to show that the hinge loss is “active" with high
probability:
yif(xi) = ± cn√
log d
< 1 when d ≥ exp(c2n)
Now, we assume that the inductive hypothesis—equations (1), (2), (3) and (4)—is true after every
timestep τ where τ ∈ {0, · · · , t}.
We now prove that the inductive hypothesis is true at timestep t+ 1, after applying gradient descent
using the (t+ 1)th batch. Since z(1) holds at timestep t, we can use the closed-form expression of
the gradient along the linear coordinate (lemma 4) to prove that equation (2) holds at timestep t+ 1
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as well:
w
(t+1)
1i = w
(t)
1i +
ηvi
4
[
2 + φ
(w1i + w2i
||w¯i||
)
+ φ
(w1i−w2i
||w¯i||
)
− 2φ
( w1i
||w¯i||
)]
± 5ηvi
d
√
log(cd2)
c
= w
(t)
1i +
ηvi
2
+
ηvi
2
|w(t)2i | · max
|δ|≤|w(t)2i |
1
||w¯t||ϕ
(w(t)1i + δ
||w¯(t)i ||
)
± 5ηvi
d
√
log(cd2)
c
(a)
=
tηvi
2
± c0(1 + cˆ)
t
√
dk log d
+
ηvi
2
+
ηvi
2
c0(1 + cˆ)
t
√
dk log d
± 5ηvi
d
√
log(cd2)
c
(b)
=
(t+ 1)ηvi
2
± c0(1 + cˆ)
t
√
dk log d
± ηvi c0(1 + cˆ)
t
√
dk log d
=
(t+ 1)ηvi
2
± c0(1 + cˆ)
t(1 + ηvi)√
dk log d
(c)
=
(t+ 1)ηvi
2
± c0(1 + cˆ)
t+1
√
dk log d
where (a) is via equation (12) in Lemma 3, (b) is because d/log3(d) ≥ 20/c0e1√c and (c) is due to
ηvi ≤ cˆ.
Similarly, since equation (1) holds at timestep t (via the inductive hypothesis), we can use the
closed-form expression of the gradient along the slab coordinate (lemma 5) to show that the weights
in the slab (i.e., second) coordinate are small (equation (3)) at timestep t+ 1 as well:
w
(t+1)
2i = w
(t)
2i +
ηvi
4
[
φ
(w1i + w2i
||w¯i||
)
− φ
(w1i−w2i
||w¯i||
)]
± 5ηvi
d
√
log(cd2)
c
= w
(t)
2i +
ηvi
2
|w(t)2i | · max
|δ|≤|w(t)2i |
1
||w¯t||ϕ
(w(t)1i + δ
||w¯(t)i ||
)
± 5ηvi
d
√
log(cd2)
c
(a)
= ±c0(1 + cˆ)
t
√
dk log d
± ηvi
2
c0(1 + cˆ)
t
√
dk log d
± ηvi
2
c0(1 + cˆ)
t
√
dk log d
≤ ± c0(1 + cˆ)
t+1
√
dk log d
where (a) is due to equations (11) in Lemma 3, (3) and d/log3(d) ≥ 20/c0e1√c.
Finally, we can use the closed-form expression of the gradient along the noise coordinate (lemma 6)
to prove that the norm of the gradient along the noise coordinates (i.e., coordinates 3 to d) is small
(equation (4)) at timestep t+ 1:
w¯
(t+1)
i = w¯
(t+1)
i +
ηvi
4
[
ϕ
(w1i + w2i
||w¯i||
)
+ ϕ
(w1i−w2i
||w¯i||
)
− 2ϕ
( w1i
||w¯i||
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
G¯1
w¯
(t)
i
||w¯i|| ±
3η|vi| log(√cd)√
cd
w¯i
||w¯i|| ±
6η|vi|√
cd
u⊥i︸ ︷︷ ︸
G¯2
We first show that the the first part of the noise gradient, G¯1, is at most ηvi/2:
ηvi
4
[
ϕ
(w1i + w2i
||w¯i||
)
+ ϕ
(w1i−w2i
||w¯i||
)
− 2ϕ
( w1i
||w¯i||
)]
=
ηvi
4
1
||w¯(t)i ||
ϕ
( w(t)1i
||w¯(t)i ||
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1(see eq. 13 in Lemma 3)
[
2− ϕ
( w(t)2i
||w¯(t)i ||
)(
exp(
w
(t)
1i w
(t)
2i
||w¯(t)i ||2
) + exp(
−w(t)1i w(t)2i
||w¯(t)i ||2
)
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤2
≤ ηvi
2
Next, we show that the `2 norm of the second part of the noise gradient, ||G¯2||, is O(1/√d):
||B|| ≤ 3η|vi| log(
√
cd)√
cd
+
6η|vi|√
cd
≤ 12η|vi|√
cd
Now, we can use the upper bounds on G1 and G2 to show that the `2 norm of the gradient along the
noise gradients is small as well:
||w¯(t+1)i || ≤ ||w¯(t)i ||+
ηvi
2
||w¯(t)i ||+
12η|vi|√
cd
(a)
≤ ||w¯(t)i ||+
ηvi
2
||w¯(t)i ||+
ηvi
2
||w¯(t)i ||
(b)
≤ c0(1 + cˆ)
t(1 + ηvi)√
k log d
(c)
≤ c0(1 + cˆ)
t+1
√
k log d
where (a) is because d/log d ≥ (24√k/c0c)2, (b) is due to equation (4) and (c) is because ηvi ≤ cˆ. 
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Since equations (2), (3) & (4) hold at timestep t (from Lemma 1), we can show that the hinge loss is
positive (i.e., yf(x) < 1) for all data points with high probability as well.
Lemma 2. Let Sn denote a set of n ∈ [cd2, dα/c] i.i.d. samples from LSN, where α > 2 and
c > 1. Suppose equations (2), (3) & (4) hold at timestep t. Also let d ≥ exp(( 8cnη )2) where
cn = 5
√
αc0(1 + cˆ)
t. Then, w.p. greater than 1− 2c3d6 , we have:
yif(xi) =
tη
4
± cn√
log d
= (t± 1/2)η
4
∀(xi, yi) ∈ Sn (5)
Proof. We use equations (2), (3) & (4) to obtain simplify the dot product between w(t)i & xj and the
indicator 1
{
w
(t)
i · xj ≥ 0
}
. First, we show that the dot product between w(t)i and xj is in the band
tηviyj
2 ± cn√k log d with high probability:
w
(t)
i · xj = w(t)1i yj + w(t)2i
yj + 1
2
εj + w¯
(t)
i · x¯j
(a)
= w
(t)
1i yj + w
(t)
2i
yj + 1
2
εj + ||w¯(t)i ||Zj
(b)
= w
(t)
1i yj + w
(t)
2i
yj + 1
2
εj ± ||w¯(t)i ||
√
8α log d w.p. 1− 2
d6
=
tηviyj
2
± c0(1 + cˆ)
t
√
dk log d
(yj +
yj + 1
2
εj)± c0(1 + cˆ)
t
√
k log d
√
8α log d via eq. 2, 3, 4
(c)
=
tηviyj
2
± 2c0(1 + cˆ)
t
√
dk log d
± 3
√
αc0(1 + cˆ)
t
√
k log d
=
tηviyj
2
± cn√
k log d
(6)
= (tyj ± 1/4)ηvi
2
when d ≥ exp((8cn
η
)2) (7)
where (a) is because w¯(t)i · x¯j = ||w¯(t)i ||N (0, 1), (b) is via lemma 7 & c > 1, and (c) is because
(yj +
yj+1
2 εj) < 2. Next, when d ≥ exp(( 8cnη )2), we can simplify 1
{
w
(t)
i · xj ≥ 0
}
as follows:
1
{
w
(t)
i · xj ≥ 0
} eq.7
≤ 1
{
(tyj ± 1/4)ηvi
2
≥ 0
}
≤

1, if t = 0
1, if t > 0 and yjvi ≥ 0
0, if t > 0 and yjvi < 0
≤ 1{t = 0 ∨ yvi ≥ 0}
(8)
We can now use equations (6) & (8) to show that yjf (t)(xj) is in the band tη/4± O(1/√log d) with
high probability:
yjf
(t)(xj) =
k∑
i=1
yjvi · ReLU(wi · xj) =
k∑
i=1
vi1{t = 0 ∨ yvi ≥ 0}
( tηvi
2
± cn√
k log d
)
=
k∑
i=1
1{t = 0 ∨ yvi ≥ 0}
( tη
2k
± cn
k
√
log d
) (a)
=
{
±k cn
k
√
log d
, if t = 0
k
2
(
tη
2k
± cn
k
√
log d
)
, if t > 0
(9)
=
tη
4
± cn√
log d
(b)
= (t± 1/2)η
4
where (a) is due to |{vi | vi > 0}| = |{vi | vi < 0}| = k/2 and (b) follows from cn/√log d ≤ η/8
when d ≥ exp((8cn/η)2) 
Lemma 3. If equations (2), (3) & (4) hold at timestep t, d > exp(( 4c0e
1
η )
2) and d/log d >
√
k, we
have:
max
|δ|≤|w(t)2i |
1
||w¯t||ϕ
(w(t)1i + δ
||w¯(t)i ||
)
≤ 1 (10)
∣∣∣φ(w(t)1i + w(t)2i||w¯(t)|| )− φ(w(t)1i − w(t)2i||w¯(t)|| )∣∣∣ ≤ 2c0(1 + cˆ)t√dk log d (11)∣∣∣φ(w(t)1i + w(t)2i||w¯(t)|| )− φ( w(t)1i||w¯(t)||)∣∣∣ ≤ c0(1 + cˆ)t√dk log d (12)
1
||w¯t||ϕ
( w(t)1i
||w¯(t)i ||
)
≤ c0(1 + cˆ)
t
√
dk log d
(13)
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Proof. Let gz(x) = 1xϕ(
z
x ) and h(x) = max|δ|≤|w(t)2i |
1
xϕ(
w
(t)
1i +δ
x ) = max|δ|≤|w(t)2i |
gwt1i+δ(x).
To prove Equation (10), we show that an upper bound on ||w(t)|| is less than a lower bound on
arg maxx h(x), which subsequently implies that h(||w(t)||) < maxx h(x) because h is an increasing
function for all |x| ≤ arg maxx h(x).
First, we find the maximizer x∗ of h(x) as follows:
max
x
h(x) = max
x
max
|δ|≤|w(t)2i |
g
w
(t)
1i +δ
(x)
(a)
= max
|δ|≤|w(t)2i |
e−1
|w(t)1i + δ|
when x∗ = |w(t)1i + δ|
where (a) follows from lemma 11. Next, we lower bound the maximizer x∗ of h(x):
x∗ = |w(t)1i + δ| ≥ |w(t)1i + w(t)2i | ≥
∣∣∣|w(t)1i | − |w(t)2i |∣∣∣ (a)≥ ∣∣∣| tηvi2 ± c0(1 + cˆ)t√dk log d | − |c0(1 + cˆ)
t
√
dk log d
|
∣∣∣
(b)
≥
∣∣∣| tηvi
2
± ηvi
8
| − |ηvi
8
|
∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣t− 1/2∣∣∣ηvi
2
≥ ηvi
4
where (a) follows from the weights in the linear and slab coordinate at timestep t (equations (2) &
(3)) and (b) is because c0(1+cˆ)
t
√
dk log d
≤ ηvi8 when
√
d ≥ 8c0e1η . Therefore, arg maxx h(x) ≥ ηvi/4. We
can use the upper bound on the `2 norm of the gradient along the noise coordinates (equation (4))
and d ≥ exp( 4c0e1η ) to show that ||w¯(t)i || is less than x∗:
||w¯(t)i || ≤
c0(1 + cˆ)
t
√
dk log d
≤ ηvi
4
≤ arg max
x
h(x)
From lemma 11, we know that h(x) is an increasing function for all |x| < x∗. This implies
that h(||w(t)i ||) ≤ h( c0(1+cˆ)
t
√
dk log d
) ≤ h(ηvi4 ) ≤ h(x∗). Therefore, when d ≥ exp(( 4c0e
1
η )
2) and
d/log d ≥ √k, we obtain the desired result as follows:
max
|δ|≤|w(t)2i |
1
||w¯t||ϕ
(w(t)1i + δ
||w¯(t)i ||
)
= h(||w(t)i ||) ≤ h(
c0e
1
√
dk log d
) ≤
√
k log d
c0e1
1
d
( η
4c0e
1 )
2 log d
≤ 1
Now, we can prove equations (11), (12) and (13) using equation (10) as follows:∣∣∣φ(w(t)1i + w(t)2i||w¯(t)|| )− φ(w(t)1i − w(t)2i||w¯(t)|| )∣∣∣ ≤ 2|w(t)2i | · max|δ|≤|w(t)2i |
1
||w¯t||ϕ
(w(t)1i + δ
||w¯(t)i ||
) (a)
≤ 2c0(1 + cˆ)
t
√
dk log d
(14)
∣∣∣φ(w(t)1i + w(t)2i||w¯(t)|| )− φ( w(t)1i||w¯(t)||)∣∣∣ ≤ |w(t)2i | · max|δ|≤|w(t)2i |
1
||w¯t||ϕ
(w(t)1i + δ
||w¯(t)i ||
) (a)
≤ c0(1 + cˆ)
t
√
dk log d
(15)
1
||w¯t||ϕ
( w(t)1i
||w¯(t)i ||
)
≤ max
|δ|≤|w(t)2i |
1
||w¯t||ϕ
(w(t)1i + δ
||w¯(t)i ||
) (a)
≤ c0(1 + cˆ)
t
√
dk log d
(16)
where (a) is due to equation (4). 
F.2 Closed-form Gradient Expressions
In this section, we provide closed-form expressions for gradients along the linear, slab and noise
coordinates: ∇w1iLf (Sn),∇w2iLf (Sn) and∇w¯iLf (Sn). First, we provide a closed-form expression
for the gradient along the linear coordinate:
Lemma 4. If n > cd2 and yif(xi) < 1 ∀(xi, yi) ∈ Sn, then w.p. greater than 1− 3n :
∇w1iLf (Sn) = −
vi
4
[
2 + φ
(w1i + w2i
||w¯i||
)
+ φ
(w1i−w2i
||w¯i||
)
− 2φ
( w1i
||w¯i||
)]
± 5vi
d
√
log(cd2)
c
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Proof.
∇w1iLf (Sn) = −
vi
n
n∑
j=1
1{yjf(xj) ≤ 1}1
{
wTi xj ≥ 0
}
yjx1j
(a)
= −vi
n
n∑
j=1
1
{
w¯Ti x¯j ≥ −wi1yj − wi21{yj = 1}εj
}
(b)
= −vi
n
n∑
j=1
1
{
Zj ≥ −w1iy − w2i1{yj = 1}εj||w¯i||
}
where Zj ∼ N (0, 1)
= −vi
{0,1,−1}∑
l
1
n
n∑
i=1
1{x2j = l}1
{
Zj ≥ −w1i(2l
2−1)−w2il
||w¯i||
}
=−vi
{0,1,−1}∑
l
(
P(x2j = l)φ
(w1i(2l2−1) + w2il
||w¯i||
)
±
√
logn
n
)
via lemma 9
=−vi
4
[φ(
w1i + w2i
||w¯i|| ) + φ(
w1i−w2i
||w¯i|| ) + 2φ(
−w1i
||w¯i|| )]±
5vi
d
√
log(cd2)
c
n > cd2
= −vi
4
[
2 + φ
(w1i + w2i
||w¯i||
)
+ φ
(w1i−w2i
||w¯i||
)
− 2φ
( w1i
||w¯i||
)]
± 5vi
d
√
log(cd2)
c
w.p. 1− 3
n
where (a) is due to yixi1 = y2i = 1 & 1{yjf(xj) ≤ 1} = 1 and (b) is due to 1
{
w¯Ti x¯j ≥ k
}
=
1{||w¯i||Zj ≥ k}. 
Similarly, we provide a closed-form expression for the gradient along the slab coordinate:
Lemma 5. If n > cd2 and yif(xi) < 1 ∀(xi, yi) ∈ Sn, then w.p. greater than 1− 3n :
∇w2iLf (Sn) = −
vi
4
[
φ
(w1i + w2i
||w¯i||
)
− φ
(w1i − w2i
||w¯i||
)]
± 5vi
d
√
log(cd2)
c
Proof.
∇w2iLf (Sn) = −
vi
n
n∑
j=1
1{yjf(xj) ≤ 1}1
{
wTi xj ≥ 0
}
yjx2j
(a)
= −vi
n
n∑
j=1
1
{
w¯Ti x¯j ≥ −w1iyj − w2i1{yj = 1}εj
}
1{yj = 1}εj
(b)
= vi
{−1,1}∑
l
1
n
n∑
j=1
(−1)1{εj=l}1
{
Zj ≥ −w1i − w2il||w¯i||
}
= −vi
{1,−1}∑
l
(
P(x2j = l)φ
(w1i + w2il
||w¯i||
)
±
√
log n
n
)
via lemma 9
= −vi
4
[φ(
w1i + w2i
||w¯i|| )− φ(
w1i−w2i
||w¯i|| )]±
5vi
d
√
log(cd2)
c
n > cd2
= −vi
4
[
φ
(w1i + w2i
||w¯i||
)
− φ
(w1i − w2i
||w¯i||
)]
± 5vi
d
√
log(cd2)
c
w.p. 1− 3
n
where (a) is due to yixi2 = 1{yi = 1}εi & 1{yjf(xj) ≤ 1} = 1 and (b) is due to 1
{
w¯Ti x¯j ≥ k
}
=
1{||w¯i||Zj ≥ k}. 
Next, we provide a closed-form expression for the gradient along the noise coordinates:
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Lemma 6. If n > cd2 and yif(xi) < 1 ∀(xi, yi) ∈ Sn, then w.p. greater than 1− 13n :
∇w¯iLf (Sn) = G¯w¯i ±
3|vi| log(√cd)√
cd
w¯i
||w¯i|| ±
6|vi|√
cd
u⊥i
G¯ = − vi
4||w¯i||
[
ϕ
(w1i + w2i
||w¯i||
)
+ ϕ
(w1i−w2i
||w¯i||
)
− 2ϕ
( w1i
||w¯i||
)]
where u⊥i is some unit vector orthogonal to w¯i.
Proof. Let S ⊂ Rd−2 denote the subspace spanned by w¯i. Then, for any x ∈ Rd, x = xS + xS⊥
where xS & xS
⊥
are the orthogonal projections of x onto S and its orthogonal complement S⊥. We
show the `2 norm of the orthogonal projections of∇w¯iLf (Sn) onto S and S⊥ are O( 1√d ):
∇w¯iLf (Sn) = −
vi
n
n∑
j=1
1{yjf(xj) ≤ 1}1
{
wTi xj ≥ 0
}
yj x¯j
= −vi
n
n∑
j=1
1
{
wTi xj ≥ 0
}
yj(x¯
S
j )︸ ︷︷ ︸
case 1
−vi
n
n∑
j=1
1
{
wTi xj ≥ 0
}
yj(x¯
S⊥
j )︸ ︷︷ ︸
case 2
Next, we show that the projection of ∇w¯iLf (Sn) onto S⊥ (i.e., case 2) has small norm w.p. greater
than 1− 1d :
||∇w¯iLf (Sn))S
⊥ || = ||vi
n
n∑
j=1
1
{
wTi xj ≥ 0
}
yj x¯
S⊥
j || = ||vi
n
n∑
j=1
1
{
wTi x
S
j ≥ 0
}
yj x¯
S⊥
j ||
(a)
≤ |vi| · ||
n∑
j=1
N (0, 1
n2
Id−2)|| = |vi| · ||N (0, 1
n
Id−2)||
(b)
≤ 4|vi|
√
d
n
± 2|vi|
√
logn
n
(c)
≤ 6|vi|√
cd
w.p. 1− 1
n
where (a) is because xSj ⊥ x¯S
⊥
j , (b) is via fact 1 and (c) is due to n ≥ cd2. Next, we show that the
norm of the gradient in the direction of w¯i (i.e., case 1) is close to G¯ w.h.p.:
∇w¯iLf (Sn))S = −
vi
n
n∑
j=1
1
{
wTi xj ≥ 0
}
yj x¯
S
j
(a)
= −
( 1
n
n∑
j=1
1
{
wTi x
S
j ≥ 0
}
yjw¯
T
i x¯j
) viw¯i
||w¯i||2
(b)
= −
( 1
n
n∑
j=1
1
{
Zj ≥ −w1iy − w2i1{yj = 1}εj||w¯i||
}
yjZj
) viw¯i
||w¯i||
= (
{0,±1}∑
l
(−1)1{l 6=0}
n
n∑
i=1
1
{
x2j = l ∧ Zj ≥ −w1i(2l
2−1)−w2il
||w¯i||
}
Zj)
viw¯i
||w¯i||
=
[
2ϕ(
wi1
||w¯i|| )− ϕ(
w1i + w2i
||w¯i|| )− ϕ(
w1i − w2i
||w¯i|| )±
5 logn√
n
] viw¯i
4||w¯i|| via lemma 10
= G¯w¯i ± 3|vi| log(
√
cd)√
cd
w¯i
||w¯i|| w.p. 1−
12
n
where (a) is because x¯Sj =
w¯Ti xj
||w¯i||2 w¯i and (b) is because (b) is due to 1
{
w¯Ti x¯j ≥ k
}
=
1{||w¯i||Zj ≥ k}. Therefore, by combining the results in case 1 and 2, the following holds w.p.
greater than 1− 13n :
∇w¯if (Sn) = G¯w¯i ±
3|vi| log(
√
cd)√
cd
w¯i
||w¯i|| ±
6|vi|√
cd
u⊥i

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F.3 Miscellaneous Lemmas
Lemma 7. LetXi ∼ N (0, σ2) and δ ∈ (0, 1). Then, maxi∈[k] |Xi| ≤ σ
√
2 log(2kδ ) with probability
greater than 1− δ,
Proof. Let ϕ denote the probability density function of the standard normal. Also let Z ∼ N (0, 1).
Then, for t ≥ 1, we have:
P(|X| ≥ σt) = P(|Z| ≥ t) = 2
∫ ∞
t
xϕ(x) dx ≤ 2
t
∫ ∞
t
xϕ(x) dx
(a)
≤ 2
t
∫ t
∞
ϕ′(x) dx ≤ 2
t
ϕ(t) ≤ 2ϕ(t)
where (a) is because ϕ′(x) = −xϕ(x). Using union bound with t =
√
2 log(2kδ ) ≥ 1 ∀δ ∈ (0, 1)
gives the desired result. 
Lemma 8. Let φ and ϕ denote the cumulative distribution function and the probability density
function of the standard gaussian. Then, for any Z ∼ N (0, 1) and k ∈ R:
E[1{Z ≥ k}Z] = ϕ(k) = exp(−k2/2)
Proof. The expectation E[1{Z ≥ k}Z] can be simplified as follows:
E[1{Z ≥ c}Z] = Pr[Z ≥ c]E [Z|Z ≥ c] = φc(k)
∫ ∞
k
x
ϕ(x)
φc(k)
dx
(a)
= −
∫ ∞
k
ϕ′(x) dx = ϕ(k)
where (a) is due to ϕ′(x) = −xϕ(x). 
Lemma 9. Let bi ∼ bernoulli(p) and Zi ∼ N (0, 1). Let Xi = bi1{Zi ≥ k} and X¯ = 1n
∑n
i=1Xi.
Then:
Pr
(
|X¯ − pφ(−k)| ≥
√
log n
n
)
≤ 1
n
Proof. Note that E
[
X¯
]
= E [Xi] = E [bi]E [1{Zi ≥ k}] = pφ(−k) and |Xi| ≤ 1. Therefore, using
Hoeffding’s inequality with t =
√
logn
n directly gives the result. 
Lemma 10. Let bi ∼ bern(p) and Zi ∼ N (0, 1). Let Xi = bi1{Zi ≥ k}Zi and X¯ = 1n
∑n
i=1Xi.
Then:
P
(
|X¯ − pϕ(k)| ≤
√
2
n
log n
)
≥ 1− 4
n
Proof. Since |Xi| = |bi1{Zi ≥ k}Zi| ≤ |Zi|, we have maxi∈[n] |Xi| ≤
√
4 log(n) w.p. at least
1 − 2n via lemma 7. From lemma 8, we get E [Xi] = E [bi]E [1{Zi ≥ k}Zi] = pϕ(k). Let A =
1
{
|Xi| ≤
√
4 log(n)∀i ∈ [n]
}
. Given A, we can use Hoeffding’s inequality with t∗ =
√
2
n log n
(and δ = 2/n) to get the desired result, as follows:
P(|X¯ − pϕ(k)| ≤ t∗) ≥ P(|X¯ − pϕ(k)| ≤ t∗ |A)P(A) ≥ (1− 2
n
)2 ≥ 1− 4
n
Therefore, X¯ = pϕ(k)±
√
2
n log n w.p. at least 1− 4n . 
Lemma 11. Let g : R\{0} → R be defined as gz(x) = 1x exp(− z
2
2x2 ). Then, (1) |z| and −|z| are the
global maximizer and minimizer respectively, and (2) g monotonically increases from −|z| to |z|.
Proof. Note that g′z(x) =
1
x2 exp(− z
2
2x2 )(
z2
x2 − 1). Therefore, the critical points of g are |z| and −|z|.
Let S = {t : |t| ≥ |z|, t ∈ R/{0}}. Note that g′z(x) < 0 for all x ∈ S and g′z(x) > 0 for all x ∈ Sc.
Therefore, (1) and (2) hold. 
Fact 1. Let X ∼ N (0, σ2Id) denote a d-dimensional gaussian vector. Then, from [70], w.p. greater
than 1− δ:
||X||2 ≤ 4σ
√
d+ 2σ
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